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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy.

By HASTINGS RASHDALL. 2 vols. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1907. — pp. ix, 312; xv, 464.

It is needless to say that the long expected work of Dr. Rashdall will receive, on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other, the interest and the attention that it undoubtedly deserves. It is "an attempt to deal with the chief topics usually discussed in books bearing the title 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics'" in a manual intended chiefly for the use of "undergraduate students." Its spirit is to be in the main that of Green and Sidgwick, "neither of whom of course said the last word upon the subject."

The treatise consists of three books: Book I, "The Moral Criterion," in which in the fashion of the text-books rival theories are set forth and examined, — Hedonism [first of all!], Rationalistic Utilitarianism, Intuitionism, the Categorical Imperative, and Ideal Utilitarianism [his own theory]; Book II, "The Individual and Society," "which is largely occupied with replies to objections and with the criticism of views more or less opposed to my own," with chapters on "The Hedonistic Calculus," "The Commensurability of Values" [a well-known *Mind* article], "Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice," "Vocation," "Moral Authority," and "Moral Autonomy"; Book III, "Man and the Universe," dealing "with metaphysical questions which do not admit of an altogether popular treatment," with chapters on "Metaphysic and Morality," "Free-Will," "Morality and Evolution," and "Casuistry."

After a short introduction, — had it been longer the work itself would have been clearer and perhaps shorter, — Psychological Hedonism (which Dr. Rashdall, but without Sidgwick's distinction, practically treats as the equivalent of Egoistic Hedonism) is taken up and easily disposed of by some of the familiar objections. Such elements of truth, however, as the author sees in the theory are retained, the chief of these being that there is and may be such a thing as the desire for pleasure, that we can desire a sum of pleasures, and that we can compare and choose between different lots of pleasure, — contentions that become the ground of his later position of the commensurability of all values and of the Good as having "elements" or parts or aspects that may be distinguished and compared.

Rationalistic Utilitarianism is then considered. This is for Dr. Rashdall practically the Utilitarianism of Sidgwick *minus* the Sidgwickian 'Dualism of the Practical Reason' and the Sidgwickian Hedonism, it being presumed from Sidgwick's various failures that a "rationalistic ethic cannot be hedonistic." The Moral Consciousness of mankind, too, pronounces goodness to have value as well as pleasure. We have thus arrived [?] at Kant's position [the treatment of Kant is throughout inadequate] that there are two *prima facie* rational ends, Virtue and Happiness. But, again, the Moral Consciousness of mankind does not favor the theory that nothing but pleasure [there is no more warrant in Rashdall than there is in Sidgwick for treating pleasure and happiness as interchangeable] and virtue are intrinsically good; it includes, besides, other elements, *e. g.*, Culture and Thought, and Volition as well as Feeling.

Intuitionism is next discussed, partly in the ordinary way as one of the theories of conduct, and partly as the outcome of Dr. Rashdall's Sidgwickian attitude to Rationalistic Utilitarianism. He accepts, *e. g.*, the distinction of Philosophical from Common Sense Intuitionism, and also (but without Sidgwick's ingenious attempt at proof) the Sidgwickian selection of the axioms of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity "as intuitions which really commend themselves upon reflection." "In the acceptance of those axioms as genuine moral axioms, Sidgwick has laid the foundations for a reconciliation between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism."

"The general result then . . . is that the true criterion of morality is the tendency of an act to promote a Well-Being or *εὐδαιμονία* which involves many other good things besides pleasure among which Virtue is the greatest. The value of these elements in human life is determined by the Practical Reason intuitively, immediately, or (if we like to say so) *a priori*. All moral judgments are ultimately judgments as to the intrinsic worth or value of some elements in consciousness or life." This "well-being," it is insisted, is "made up of elements of consciousness, *each of which is itself an object of moral valuation*" [italics mine]. The Intuitionism of the Good is thus definitely and deliberately substituted by Dr. Rashdall for the Intuitionism of the Right. "The Intuitionists were mistaken in supposing that the moral Reason on which they rightly base our ethical judgments either lays down fixed and exceptionless laws of conduct; or issues isolated arbitrary disconnected decrees *pro re nata* without reference to probable results."

Now this declaration of the unsatisfactory character of a merely

Dogmatic or Perceptual Intuitionism is only what we would expect from a scholarly thinker like the author. But is he himself so free from the taint of an unsystematic intuitionism as he thinks he is? I think not. And for the following reasons. (1) It is, as has been stated, an integral part of his own theory that the various 'elements' in the Good are estimated intuitively and immediately and *a priori* by the Practical Reason. (2) The Intuitional aspect of his Ideal Utilitarianism is not sufficiently differentiated either from Perceptual Intuitionism or from the Moral Sense theory and the entire 'Value' philosophy of so many recent European thinkers. The chapter on "Reason and Feeling" (another famous Sidgwickian title), which is intended to differentiate the 'rational' aspect of his moral judgments from the merely æsthetic character of the Moral Sense theory, only ends by bringing moral and æsthetic judgments very closely together. (3) Apart from the *quasi* Intuitionism of sentences like the following: "No experience will tell us what the good is unless we include in our experience an unavowed judgment of value, and value therefore is the ultimate characteristic of the moral judgment, the fundamental idea of morality," — the 'Value' philosophy of Dr. Rashdall is nowhere conclusively proved or rationally grounded at any stage of the argument.

I do not of course, in this connection, feel competent either to affirm or to deny that a judgment of value is the ultimate and the determining element in any moral judgment, and I willingly admit that, from a general speculative or even a common sense point of view (*e. g.*, about the 'new' this and the 'new' that, things which of course we 'value' in different ways), the 'value' of a course of conduct is often apparently the only thing we seem able to estimate. But this is not what the man does who does his 'duty,' and I do not think that it is the highly sophisticated concept of 'value' that is present to the mind of the man who reverences his conscience as his king or the man who thinks of his duty, — as do nine-tenths of mankind, according to Dr. Rashdall, — in terms of religion. Instead of thinking, then, with Dr. Rashdall, of our "distinctively moral judgments" as "our ordinary judgments of value," I would be inclined to relegate (as does Ehrenfels apparently) value to economics, æsthetics, epistemology, comparative psychology, etc., and 'right' and 'wrong' to the normative aspects of human volition, — a thing that is touched but not developed in this treatise.

"Our view that acts are right or wrong according as they tend or do not tend to promote a Well-Being or *εὐδαιμονία* or good consisting of various elements the relative value of which is intuitively discerned

may be called Ideal-Utilitarianism." That is to say, Dr. Rashdall's theory, although Utilitarian, goes, in its position that all moral judgments are ultimately judgments as to the "value of ends," altogether beyond ordinary Hedonism. "The 'Utilitarianism' will perhaps suggest that we do estimate actions by their tendency to promote human good, while the qualification 'ideal' will remind us that the good for which we seek is not a conception got by abstraction from a number of empirically given experiences of pleasure or pain, but an ideal set up by rational judgments of value passed upon all the elements of our actual experience."

So much, then, by way of an attempt to get at Dr. Rashdall's teaching, very largely in his own way and very largely in his own words. The arrangement of the work as a whole, however, it seems to me, will prove almost as perplexing to the average reader or to the junior student as the comparative absence of a convincing or independent proof of its central contention about value. The longest and most interesting portion of Book III is the metaphysical part. And even here what we find is not so much a systematic treatment of all the main problems of the metaphysic of ethics as a highly impressive treatment of some ethical problems in relation to contemporary or recent views upon the philosophy of religion, the latter being obviously the region of our author's deepest interest, and that upon which the entire weight of his constructions will be seen to rest. The chapter on "Morality and Evolution," for example, might well have gone elsewhere,—in Book I, say, to which the average student will come with his head full of presuppositions about Evolution as a sort of Copernicanism of the Nineteenth Century. Or it should not have stayed where it is without being associated with a thorough metaphysical discussion of the concepts of good, evil, adaptation, final cause, optimism, pessimism, meliorism, development, change, etc. The "Casuistry" chapter, too, would seem to belong elsewhere,—to a possible section (suggested by the title of Book II, "The Individual and Society") on applied Moral Philosophy. Dr. Rashdall has, in fact, abundant material for a section on the topic just mentioned, *e. g.*, his chapter on Justice [a luminous chapter containing the roots of a better theory of morals than the value theory, *i. e.*, a theory connecting the moral judgment with personality, Sidgwick's lack and Green's strong point], his chapter on "Punishment and Forgiveness," that of the existing Book II on the belated or abstract topic of "Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice," and the idea he mentions in his few words on Evolution, that race maintenance requires the elimination of the unfit.

A great deal, indeed, of the present Book II, its entire treatment of objections and so on, might perhaps have been put in a condensed form in Book I, to clarify or justify the treatment of Value and the Good. And the existing arrangement gives an almost unintelligible prominence to the Pleasure theory, especially when we bear in mind the fact that it is thrown out of his own Ideal Utilitarianism. Dr. Rashdall might well in fact have explained to the ordinary student how it came into ethics at all, for its "frank naturalness" and its "extreme simplicity" are no valid reasons. They do not do away with that opposition between virtue and pleasure which is as old as the story of the Fall or of the Choice of Hercules.

Then, as compared with Book III, Book I is certainly too short. It might well contain indications of the origins and the limits and the natural scope of the different theories, instead of merely presenting them in a quasi-dialectic or artificial thought construction. And its omission of the Evolutional and the Sociological theories of morals affects not only the matter of the volumes but the form of the whole and the central argumentation about value. Dr. Rashdall, for example, cannot and does not really abide by his attitude toward the Evolution theory, — that it belongs more to Anthropology and Sociology, etc., than to ethical theory and the history of philosophy. He admits that its facts "may contain instruction for the philosopher." And the effect of Evolution on the Value theory, in view of the teaching of men like Nietzsche, Harnack, and others, is surely a subject to which he might have given some careful attention.

Then, like Sidgwick (who merely quoted the opinion of someone to this effect), Dr. Rashdall seems to think of Sociology in the purely external way, as "tending to break up into a group of Sociological Sciences." This attitude takes almost no recognition of the effect of the concept, faulty as it is, of the social organism upon our English moral philosophy from the days of the Essay of Professor Jones in the Seth-Haldane volume to those of Mackenzie, Stephen, Alexander, Bosanquet, and many others. Sociology, even of the biological and the psychological description, has rendered obsolete or at least merely relative the distinction between Self-Realization and Self-Sacrifice. It also throws important light, *e. g.*, upon the supposed derivation of Altruism from Egoism to which Dr. Rashdall expresses his general adherence, and, — what is more important for his book, — upon the relations of the 'valuations' of the individual to those of the (religious) community to which he ultimately appeals.

There can be little doubt, I think, that it is the speculative or the

concluding portion of the treatise that will excite the greatest general and special interest. The impressions produced by it upon the mind differs altogether from those awakened by the earlier books. Here it is the Oxford Idealist who speaks out of a fullness and resourcefulness due to his consciousness of standing at last upon his own ground. It is just as if Sidgwick had rewritten for us his *Methods of Ethics* in terms of the philosophy of postulates that is drawn across the very last of his last editions. The first thing with which we are gratified is the formulation of a sound and justifiable position in respect of the familiar controversy as to the dependence or the non-dependence of ethics upon metaphysics. Metaphysic and Morality, we are told, are connected because (1) a true account of Morality involves metaphysical postulates, (2) some of the conclusions of Metaphysic are of importance for Morality, (3) Moral Philosophy supplies data to Metaphysic. The postulates of ethics, the facts of the ethico-religious consciousness (we shall immediately see how closely he identifies ethics and religion) which Dr. Rashdall deems of supreme importance to general constructive philosophy are substantially the *Ideas* of Kant,—Freedom, *i. e.*, the reality of a finite individual self to whom, as their cause, actions may be attributed, God as the Mind and Will in which the Absolute Moral Ideal exists (for it cannot exist nowhere, he contends), Immortality as a postulate of the belief in a rational world order or in God. And then, although this half of his subject is by no means so adequately treated as the other, a “fourth postulate,” the reality of evil, the “negation of optimism, the assertion that not everything in the Universe is very good, and that the distinction between good and evil belongs to the real nature of things and not merely to appearance.” There is of course nothing new about the Theism and the Pluralism of these positions. They were present in the author’s well-known “stroke” essay (one of the best in the book, along with that of the “bow,” Professor Stout) in the “Oxford Eight” volume. The idealistic theory of Being on which they repose both there and here, the cosmic idealism that prevents his present ethical argument for the existence of God from being construed as a mere argument from thought to being (open, say, to the difficulties of the ‘correspondence theory’ of Mr. Joachim) is, however, a reason against associating Dr. Rashdall’s philosophy of postulates with that of Pragmatism, as popularly understood, although his anti-Intellectualism is at one with the Personal Idealism or the Humanism associated with Pragmatism. Still it is just possible even that the philosophy of religion of the future may have to incorporate elements of truth from the transcendent or the

super-moral Absolute of Mr. Bradley and his associates along with some of Dr. Rashdall's Pluralistic results. For if there is one thing that is not perfectly cleared up in Dr. Rashdall's philosophy of postulates, it is the relation of the Idealistic faith that the distinctions we are compelled to make about experience owe their existence to the Universal Mind, to the relativity philosophy of such a sentence as the following : "That all human knowledge is inadequate to express the true nature of ultimate Reality will be admitted by metaphysicians of almost all schools," and to some of his declarations about the "defective nature" of our moral ideas. Morality may, in other words, be from the standpoint of speculative theology much more of a merely human affair than Dr. Rashdall makes it out to be.

And now for the specific relations that for Dr. Rashdall exist between Ethics and Philosophy and Religion. Like Dr. McTaggart, he practically comes before the world with the position that the greatest service of Philosophy or Idealism is to be found in the matter of the foundations it lays for the religious interests of mankind. And just as Dr. Martineau's *Types* might be regarded as in its day an important piece of Apologetic for Theism, so may the *Theory of Good and Evil* be regarded as one of the most important of recent apologies for Christianity. It was essential, we remember, to Dr. Rashdall's theory, that the Good should be seen to consist of various elements of well-being, each of which was itself an object of moral valuation, — a position that exposes him not only to the difficulty of expressing "objective relations of conscious mind" (the term is Sidgwick's) like Truth and Beauty and Culture and Volition in terms of his Hedonistic or Value Calculus, and to the difficulties of a merely Perceptual Intuitionism, but also to the more serious difficulty of providing for the *authority* or the *objectivity* of the moral standard. This is a difficulty that was noticed by the careful Sidgwick in the following words : "In the recognition of conduct as 'right' is involved an authoritative prescription to do it ; but when we have judged conduct to be good, it is not yet clear that we ought to prefer this kind of good to all other good things ; some standard for estimating the relative values of different 'goods' has still to be sought." Now nowhere in his two volumes does Dr. Rashdall find an authoritative or objective standard for estimating either the good or different goods, short of the moral will or the revealed moral will of the Deity. In one place at least he speaks (with Mr. Moore) of the 'good' as indefinable, but in other places, and generally, as having no meaning apart from its elements, which men, of course, will value to the end of time in their own way. Only in his

moral theology do we get the authority and objectivity demanded by any tenable theory of morals. "The belief in God, though not (like the belief in a real and active self) a postulate of there being such a thing as morality at all, is the logical presupposition of an objective or absolute Morality."

Now, however interesting and important this dictum may be, in many respects, it must nevertheless be regarded as a confession of the author's failure to do what he set out to do, — to give the student of ethics a tenable or a working theory of the meaning and authority of the terms right and wrong, etc. Even if we defend him by saying that his solution of the moral criterion is the Revealed Will of God, — at least a theory and perhaps in one form or another the theory of the greatest number of men, — we must remember that it was only the moral ideal that enabled him to maintain the supremacy of the Christian Religion as the religion containing the most complete 'identification' of the 'Will of God' with the 'ethically best.' And apart from this point of the present or the future of liberal religion being connected with an independent theory of the moral ideal, Dr. Rashdall seems to have discovered by accident, as it were, the fact that: "The true ideal of human nature is undoubtedly the ideal which has been expressed by the word Autonomy. The ideal is that each individual should do what in the exercise of his own consciousness he sees to be right." It is true that he adds that the "education of the moral consciousness up to this level" is only possible through the action of a strong social conscience, but it is not clearly enough recognized by him that this social or religious consciousness is in turn bound up with a legislative or normative conception of personality, — beyond which it would seem that ethics *qua* ethics need not vitally concern itself to go. Dr. Rashdall could, in other words, have made good in a preface or an appendix all the points he makes (and with reason) about the actual connection in the case of the majority of mankind of moral with religious ideas, and about the improvement that would take place in their books, if philosophers could only bear this in mind, or at least recognize it as a fact; and then go on, as do books on economics, say, to consider man from one single point of view, the *ethical* in his case, the case in point. In this case his value theory and his theory of the authority of the moral standard would have been reconstructed from the first of his four postulates rather than the second, and we should have had from him an ethical work proper instead of one, — for which of course we are more than grateful, — upon the contribution of ethics and ethical considerations to general philosophy.

Enough has doubtless been said to represent the contents and the scope of these two accomplished and suggestive volumes. *Wer vieles bringt wird manchem etwas bringen*, and Dr. Rashdall has really given to both junior and senior students, and to the general intelligent reader of the day, — to the person, say, who is anxious to read something incorporating the older Intellectualism of the Idealists with the Voluntarism of the Pragmatists, — a veritable magazine of reflection. His work, too, is a noble monument to the industry and the breadth of mind of an academic teacher who has attempted not merely to criticise, as do some recent books of the same high level, the teaching of Green and his school, but to combine this with other traditional views and with newer views. And the fact of its continuing the work of the *rapprochement* of English Idealism and English Empiricism, begun by both Green and Sidgwick, renders it valuable and interesting not only to Englishmen but to all future students of British philosophy. As a sort of fusion, however, of the teaching of Green and of Sidgwick, his own Value theory cannot pass muster, I fear, without a far more penetrating study of the presuppositions and limitations both of the doctrines of these men, particularly Sidgwick, and of the entire Value philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. Meinong and Ehrenfels, for example, do not seem to be mentioned at all, although Simmel is frequently referred to. And although a prominent post-Kantian like Hartmann receives a good deal of attention in connection with such points as Autonomy and Heteronomy and the doctrine of a super-moral Absolute, it seems strange that Dr. Rashdall's Ritschlian and Voluntaristic sympathies did not lead him to give more attention to the views of Lotze on the Good and on the world of worths.

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Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst. Zweiter Teil: Die ästhetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst. Von THEODOR LIPPS. Hamburg und Leipzig, Voss, 1906.— pp. viii, 645.

Part I of this work, *Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, which appeared in 1903, was noticed in this REVIEW (Vol. XIII, pp. 677 ff.), and I may refer to that notice for a characterization of the general standpoint and method. The present volume devotes a hundred pages to a further exposition of general principles, and the remainder to a study of the plastic and spatial arts. There is abundant evidence of penetrating analysis, subtle discrimination, and suggestive comment. There is a detailed study of the various fundamental or type forms of